What Did The Geneva Agreements Of 1954 Propose For Vietnam
If Molotov`s refusal at the July 18 limited session to warn the conference of failure signaled new communist efforts to reach an agreement, his subsequent actions proved it. Between 18 and 21 July, the conference participants were able to iron out their differences sufficiently to reach agreements that are now commonly referred to as the Geneva “Conventions”. In fact, the agreements consist of military arrangements for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to fulfill the main task of the conference of restoring peace in Indochina and a final declaration designed to create the conditions for future political solutions throughout Indochina. The nature of the compromises reached at the eleventh hour and the main lines of the agreement are discussed below. Convinced that the French had already gone far in deflating some of the key provisions of the US-British memorandum, Dulles reiterated the government`s position that it had the right “not to approve a solution that we believe seriously compromises certain principles which, according to the United States, will not be affected in relation to them. whether our own struggle against communism is to continue successfully. Perhaps to rationalize the impact of his rejection, Dulles concluded by writing that the U.S. decision might actually help the French: “If our behavior creates some uncertainty in the minds of the Communists, it could strengthen your hand more than our presence in Geneva [Doc. 67] Mendès-Fraiice had been rejected, however, and although Dulles had left the door somewhat open on his or Smith`s return if the “circumstances” were to change, it seemed more likely that France would only have to work alongside the British for a deal. The exchange between Dulles, Mendes and France was essentially an exercise in credibility, with the French prime minister desperately trying to convince the minister that Paris really supported the Seven Points and would really stick to them.
When Mendes-France read Dulles` letter, he protested that France would not accept anything unacceptable to the United States and went so far as to say that Dulles` presence at the conference would give him veto power over decisions made. Moreover, Mendès-France warns of the catastrophic effects of an American retreat on the American position in Europe no less than in the Far East; Withdrawal, he said, would certainly be interpreted as a step towards isolationism. Asked what alternative his government had in mind if the conference failed even with a high-level AMERICAN presence, Mendès-France replied that there must be a complete internationalization of the war.* On June 15, Vyacheslav Molotov proposed that the ceasefire be monitored by a monitoring commission chaired by neutral India. On June 16, Zhou Enlai said that the situation in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos was not the same and should be treated separately. He suggested that Laos and Cambodia could be treated as neutral nations if they did not have foreign bases. On the 18th. In June, Pham Van Dong said the Viet Minh would be ready to withdraw its troops from Laos and Cambodia if no foreign bases were established in Indochina. :581 The apparent softening of the communist position appears to be the result of a meeting between the DRV, the Chinese and Soviet delegations on June 15, during which Zhou warned the Viet Minh that their military presence in Laos and Cambodia threatened to undermine the Vietnam negotiations. .